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Although the density of human population is the primary variable that
causes a place to be considered rural,' we often think about "rural" as describing
certain qualities of the land. Because of lower population, rural places are less
developed, more natural, peaceful, and beautiful. We often think of the land as
more important to rural lifestyles and livelihoods. It therefore seems that the
law relating to real property would be especially sensitive to the character of
rural land.
In writing this Article, I have searched traditional private law regarding
real property - much of the subject matter found in property casebooks looking for ways in which real property law is sensitive to the character of rural
land. I have looked for areas of the law where different rules are applied to rural
and urban places and areas where the same rule is commonly applied differently
in rural and urban places. Predictably, almost all such differences relate to rules

Professor of Law, University of Wyoming College of Law. B.A.. Brigham Young University. 1990: J.D., Harvard Law School, 1993. Thanks to Ben Hewett and Justin Hesser for their
research assistance and to the Dyekman Law Faculty Research Fund for its financial support.
I

See, e.g.. Debra Lyn Bassett, The Rural Venue, 57 ALA. L. REV. 941, 951 (2006) ("Perhaps

the only thread that ties rural areas together is their lower population densities."). Lisa R. Pruitt,
Rural Rhetoric, 39 CoNN. L. REV. 159, 179 (2006) (discussing definitions of rural places based on

population).
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concerning the use of land, rather than rules concerning ownership of land, like
title, estates, and transfers of land. Some observable differences in outcomes
seem unremarkable because they simply result from application of general, consistent rules in different physical settings, without apparent patterns resulting
from the rural or urban character of the area. In this Article, I discuss five areas
of property law where the substance or application of property rules has differed
between rural and urban places: nuisance, landlord-tenant, adverse possession,
prescriptive easements, and surface water. I identify such differences in each of
those categories and argue that some are valid and some are not. Many differences are valid, appropriate responses to real differences between rural and urban places. Some differences, however, are invalid because they are based on
outdated, unwarranted, or over-generalized assumptions about rural land and
people. Other differences are invalid because they result from valuing rural uses
less than urban uses and not fully recognizing the value of rural uses. On the
other hand, I also argue that some property rules have not differed enough in
rural places, in that they have not appropriately responded to unique rural needs
or circumstances, and that they should be more sensitive to those distinctive
characteristics.

1. PRIVATE NUISANCE LAW
A nuisance is an intentional and unreasonable interference with another's use and enjoyment of land.3 That general rule does not vary between rural
and urban areas. Although there are certainly relevant differences between rural
and urban areas, those differences do not require variation in the common law
nuisance rule because the rule itself requires consideration of all the relevant
circumstances in deciding whether a particular interference is unreasonable.
The relevant circumstances include the appropriateness of the challenged activity in the area,4 the extent and nature of the harm caused by the activity, and "the
nature, utility, and social value of the use or enjoyment invaded."5 Courts must

2

For example. landowners are strictly liable for damages resulting from removing lateral

support necessary to adjacent land in its natural state, but are only liable in negligence for removing support necessary to improvements on adjacent land. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 817, 819 (1989). Because rural areas are less developed, establishing strict liability may be
easier in rural areas. But if so, this is not because of categorizing land as rural or urban. Regardless of the rural or urban character, courts simply consider the physical condition of the land in
question, actual and hypothetical.
3
See, e.g., id § 822 (stating that one is liable for private nuisance if "his conduct is a legal
cause of an invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land, and the invasion is ...intentional and unreasonable").
4
See 58 AM. JUR. 2D Nuisances § 151 (2002) [hereinafter AM. JUR. Nuisances] (stating that
determining reasonableness requires considering the suitability of the location of defendant's use).
5
Id. § 150.
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balance this harm to the plaintiff against the utility of the defendant's use to
decide whether the harm is unreasonable. 6
Differences between rural and urban places can greatly affect the evaluation of the harm suffered and the balancing of that harm against the defendant's
use. In fact, private nuisance law may be the best illustration of how and why
differences in rural and urban settings result in different applications of property
law. Nuisance law also illustrates how the common law balancing approach
may result in unwanted outcomes, prompting legislative changes to the common
law.
A.

Characterof the Area

One consideration in determining the reasonableness of interference is
the character of the area where the interference occurs.7 The very same activity
may be reasonable in one place but unreasonable in another place. As Justice
Sutherland famously said, "A nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong
place, like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard." 8 Obviously, any legal
rule that directly considers whether an activity is appropriate in a particular
place may result in different outcomes in rural and urban settings. 9
When the challenged activity is normal and expected in a rural setting, it
is unlikely to be a nuisance.10 Therefore, many cases have observed that animal
smells and noises and other agricultural activities generally should be expected
6

See id § 151 ("In deciding whether one's use of his or her property is a nuisance to his or

her neighbors it is necessary to balance the competing interests of the landowners ....The unreasonable use element of nuisance ...[requires a] determination of [the] reasonableness of use
involving the balancing of the harm done to the plaintiff against the utility of the defendant's use
of his or her property ....
").
7
See, e.g., Morgan County Concrete Co. v. Tanner, 374 So. 2d 1344, 1346 (Ala. 1979)
("[L]ocality may be determinative in deciding whether the use of land by defendant unreasonably
interferes with plaintiffs use of his land so as to constitute a nuisance.").
8
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
9
A similar issue may arise with interpreting covenants. For example. the parties to a covenant restricting use of land to residential purposes may intend to allow uses that are typical or
expected in that particular residential area. Therefore, a residential covenant in an urban area may
be interpreted to exclude horses, but a residential covenant in a rural area may be interpreted to
allow horses. See Kalika v. Harvey, No. 10331, 1987 WE 488701, at *1 (Va. Cir. Ct. Aug. 21,
1987) (holding that a residential purposes covenant was not violated by keeping horses on the
property "[c]onsidering the size of the lot involved, its location in a rural area adjacent to farmland
and the proclivity of landowners in rural Loudoun County to have horses for recreational purposes"): cf Becker v. Arnfeld, 466 P.2d 479, 480 (Colo. 1970) (en banc) (holding that keeping chickens violated residential covenant prohibiting animals except for pets because keeping chickens
was not "normally associated with residential, family living").
10 See, e.g., Flansburgh v. Coffey, 370 N.W.2d 127, 131 (Neb. 1985) ("The fact that a residence is in a rural area requires an expectation that the residence will be subjected to normal rural
conditions, but not to such excessive abuse as to destroy the ability to live and enjoy the home, or
such as to reduce the value of the residential property.").
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in rural agricultural areas, and therefore are less likely to be nuisances." For
example, a Tennessee court held that a chicken house in a rural area was not a
nuisance, observing that while its smell was offensive to the "city slicker" plaintiff, it did not affect the "country folk" who lived nearby. 12 Similarly, the dust
from a gravel road may be a nuisance
in more urbanized places, but in a rural
13
area it may be typical and reasonable.
On the other hand, some activities that are normal in urban areas are out
of place in rural areas and are therefore more likely to be nuisances in a rural
setting. 14 For example, one court observed that urban areas are noisier, and
noise is therefore more likely to be a nuisance in rural places:
The general rule as to effect of locality in determining what
constitutes a nuisance applies in the case of noise. What may
be a nuisance in one locality may not in another. Noises may be
a nuisance in the country which would not be in a populous
city. A person who resides in the center of a large city must not
expect to be surrounded by the stillness which prevails in a rural
district. He must necessarily bear some of the noise and occasionally feel slight vibrations produced by the movement and
labor of its people and by the hum of its mechanical industries. I

1

See, e.g.. Arbor Theatre Corp. v. Campbell Soup Co.. 296 N.E.2d 11, 14 (111.App. Ct. 1973)

(holding that mushroom composting operation in rural area was "suitable to the locality" and
therefore not a nuisance despite substantial impairment of neighboring property's use and enjoyment): Stottlemyer v. Crampton. 200 A.2d 644. 647 (Md. 1964) (holding that driving cattle along
public road was not a nuisance in a rural community. noting that it did not affect property owners'
use and enjoyment in any way "other than that which normally should be expected by persons
living along a rural road"); Cline v. Franklin Pork, Inc., 313 N.W.2d 667, 670 (Neb. 1981) ("The
fact that the residence is in a rural area requires an expectation that it will be subjected to normal
rural conditions .... ").
12
Johnson v. Malone, No. E2001- 02106-COA-R3-CV, 2002 WL 1063936, at *1 (Tenn. Ct.
App. May 28, 2002).
13
See Neyland v. Schneider, 615 S.W.2d 285, 287 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981) ("We hold as a
matter of law that defendant's use of the roadway is not unreasonable. The two tracts of land are
located in a rural farming area. Defendant's road is not materially different from the many other
caliche gravel roads in the community.").
14
See Pruitt. supra note , at 188 89 ("[C]ourts may be more tolerant of agricultural annoyances in rural areas, but less tolerant of other irritations that interfere with the perceived rural
idyll. Several states have held, for example, that while a race track is not a nuisance per se, it may
constitute a nuisance per accidens under certain circumstances, as in a rural area. Many courts
thus more aggressively defend rural places against nuisances, especially non-agricultural ones,
suggesting that these presumptively pristine and quiet areas are especially sensitive to the loud,
the smelly. and the ugly.") (footnotes omitted).
15

Alabama Power Co. v. Stringfellow, 153 So. 629, 632 (Ala. 1934); see also Russell v.

Thierry, No. CV010385198S, 2001 WL 1734441, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 11, 2001)
("[P]laintiffs are subjected to noise which, by city standards, is not loud. However, in the particu-
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This aspect of private nuisance law is generally a good example of how
courts should and do consider the distinctive characteristics of rural places in
making legal decisions. Even so, there is still a danger of erroneous or unjust
application of the law to rural places resulting from stereotypes.16 As Lisa Pruitt
observed about a wide variety of cases dealing with rural places:
[J]udges in many of these cases appear to base not only their
rhetoric, but also their rulings, on stereotypes of rural people.
Thus, the distinctions they draw between rural and urban are not
necessarily accurate assessments or depictions of rural livelihoods, nor of the differences between rural and urban. Judicial
decisions are therefore not necessarily sensitive to or reflective
of rural realities.
Judges who discuss the rural and base their rulings on its legal
relevance are often taking judicial notice of the consequences of
being rural rather than inviting and considering 17hard evidence
about rural people, their lifestyles, and their land.
Recognizing that an activity may be more or less objectionable in a rural area than in an urban area is good, but it is only the first step. Courts must
also recognize that rural areas vary widely just as urban areas do. Courts should
be specific about what attributes of an area are relevant to the dispute and
should examine the evidence of those attributes in each case rather than relying
lar setting in which these homes are located there is noise and, more importantly, the noise is
unnecessary."); Wieland v. Neal, No. 02-0777, 2003 WL 1969237, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 30,
2003) ("The neighborhood is primarily agricultural; thus, the Wielands could expect to be subject
to the normal uses and sounds of an agricultural area. However, . . . 'the riding of dirt bikes for
extended periods of time is not a normal use of agricultural land."') Parish of East Feliciana v.
Guidry. 923 So. 2d 45. 54 (La. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that motocross track was a nuisance in
rural locale and noting that "the ambient noise level for a rural community of this nature would be
much lower than that of an urban community"); Frank v. Cossitt Cement Prods., 97 N.Y.S.2d 337,
339 (Sup. Ct. 1950) ("Whereas noise is an inevitable incident to urban life, peace and quiet should
be a concomitant of rural life."); Guarina v. Bogart, 180 A.2d 557, 561 (Pa. 1962) ("The person

who lives in the middle of a city cannot, of course, ask to be immunized from the effects of the
turbulence, traffic and noises which are inevitably part of urban life, but the person who moves
into a rural area to escape such turbulence, traffic and noises has the right to ask the law to bar
turbulence, traffic and noises from pursuing him.") (footnote omitted).
16 See Bassett, supra note , at 963 ("Some rural areas are beautiful but others are not -just as
some cities are beautiful but others are not - which requires that land use decisions be grounded
in specific facts rather than generalized stereotypes. The use of stereotypes. even positive stereotypes. in legal decisions renders the stereotype an absolute
embodying the perception of the
facts, serving as an analytical shortcut, and compelling a particular, predestined conclusion. In
other words, the mental shortcuts provided by rural stereotypes are so powerful as to risk 'law by
stereotype'
the substitution of a stereotype for the scrutiny, reasoning, evaluation, and judgment expected in legal decisionmaking."j.
17

Pruitt, supra note, at 207.
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on assumptions or stereotypes about the attributes of rural areas." This may
come more naturally to courts in nuisance cases than other types of cases because they must consider not just the character of the locality, but also the character and extent of the intrusion. So while nuisance cases may often include
stereotypical expressions of rural quiet and beauty, they will generally become
more specific about the relevant attributes of the area in the course of evaluating
the extent to which the specific noise or other intrusion impairs those
attributes. 19
B.

Extent of the Injury

The character and extent of the injury suffered are also relevant when
determining whether an activity is a private nuisance.2
Courts generally have recognized that rural landowners are entitled to
enjoy their property just as much as other landowners. 2 ' However, when a court
balances competing interests against the extent of the injury, it may seem natural
and logical that if more people are affected, the injury is greater. By definition,
rural areas have fewer people,22 and therefore in rural areas injuries would tend
to be less than in urban areas 3 Of course, this is just one factor to consider, and
a court may still find that an activity is a nuisance even though few are affected
by it.2 4 After all,2 5a private nuisance claim need not prove injury to anyone other
than the plaintiff
18

See id. at 238 ("Instead of unthinking and unexplained endorsement of a party's classifica-

tion of a place as rural, courts should be explicit about the characteristic for which they are using
the word as a proxy. e.g., scenic beauty, lack of anonymity. remoteness. Judges should then analyze the legal issue in light of that characteristic.").
19
See, e.g.. Russell. 2001 WL 1734441, at *2 (noting that "plaintiffs are entitled to be free
from unnecessary noise, particularly in view of the secluded and rural environment," and discussing evidence about when and where the noise was audible, the extent of intrusion on enjoyment of
the plaintiffs' property, and quieter alternatives for defendant's use).
20
See AM. JUR. Nuisances. supra note 4. § 150 ("Whether a particular condition is a nuisance
depends not merely on its inherent nature, but also on a consideration of all relevant facts, such as
the nature and extent and nature of the harm involved .... ") (footnotes omitted).
21
See, e.g., Cline v. Franklin Pork, Inc., 313 N.W.2d 667, 670 (Neb. 1981) ("The fact that the
residence is in a rural area requires an expectation that it will be subjected to normal rural conditions but not to such excessive abuse as to destroy the ability to live in and enjoy the home, or
reduce the value of the neighboring property. A rural home and a rural family, within reason, are
entitled to the same relative protection as others.").
22
See Pruitt, supra note, at 179 (discussing definitions of rural places based on population).
23
See Miller v. Jasinski, 705 S.W.2d 442, 445 (Ark. Ct. App. 1986) ("Although the manner of
operation of an otherwise legal activity within a predominately residential area can constitute an
abatable nuisance, the chancellor expressly found that the landfill was not operated in such a
manner as to cause unreasonable harm to adjacent owners and that the area in which it was located
was a rural one 'with farm lands and scattered housing."').
24
See Frank v. Cossitt Cement Prods., 97 N.Y.S.2d 337, 340 (Sup. Ct. 1950) ("Although only
a few persons are disturbed by the nighttime operation of defendant's plant ... nevertheless the
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This nuisance factor illustrates one of the basic problems with law and
policy concerning rural places: whenever a decision is influenced by weighing
how much is at stake with a particular rule, the lower density of development
and population in rural areas may mean that the interest of property owners is
less and therefore results in different outcomes for rural places and urban places.
This may not be wrong. Maximizing net social benefits generally seems wise.
But, as private nuisance law indicates, any individual property owner should
have the same assurance that she can use and enjoy her property without interference, even if the interference comes from a use that may have greater economic
value.
C.

Relative Values of Competing Uses

Not only may the injury to rural property seem less because it affects
fewer people, it may also seem more easily outweighed by the conflicting activity. In deciding whether an activity is a nuisance, courts not only consider the
extent of the harm to the plaintiff, but they weigh that harm against the harm of
preventing the challenged activity. This balancing considers not just the
value
26
to the individuals involved, but the social value of their activities as well.
Furthermore, even if a court finds that a nuisance exists, it will not enjoin the nuisance if the injury to the plaintiff is small in comparison to the injury
that an injunction would cause to the defendant and the public. 2' Here again, the
injury to rural plaintiffs may seem smaller both because there are fewer injured
parties and because their land uses are less intensive and less financially valuable.28 In fact, some courts have suggested that an injunction against "an offendefendant should not be permitted to shatter the quiet of this rural neighborhood for twenty-one
hours of the twenty-four. Such use of its property is unreasonable.").
25
See Guarina v. Bogart, 180 A.2d 557, 561 (Pa. 1962) ("The interest of a 'single householder' is, however, not to be treated lightly. A man's home may no longer be his castle in the classic
sense but it is still the depository of sovereign rights, one of which is the inevitable and inalienable
right to peace and tranquility consistent with the rights of his neighbors.").
26
See, e.g., Pate v. City of Martin, 614 S.W.2d 46, 47 (Tenn. 1981) (noting that a court in
deciding whether an activity is a nuisance must consider, among other things, the "nature, utility
and social value" of both the challenged use and the use invaded); Johnson v. Malone, No. E200102106-COA-R3-CV, 2002 WL 1063936, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 28, 2002) ("Regarding the
'nature, utility and social value of the use', the Court found that there was nothing illegal about
the poultry farm, in fact, the proof was undisputed that it was an efficient, well-run operation. The
proof was also undisputed that the farm served a valuable purpose for the Malones. in that it allowed them to keep and work at their farm.").
27
See, e.g., Estancias Dallas Corp. v. Schultz, 500 S.W.2d 217. 219 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
28
See Texas Lime Co. v. Hindman, 300 S.W.2d 112, 123 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957) ("[S]ince the
lime plant.., is a lawful, useful and necessary business, and ... it does and has contributed to the
welfare and prosperity of the community in which it is located, as well as to the health and welfare
of the people of the State of Texas, in that useful and necessary products are being produced....
the granting of an injunction ... would be unjust. improper. inequitable and would result in an
unbalancing of the equities in favor of a few individuals as against the public at large.").
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sive although necessary undertaking" may be granted only "when it could be as
easily and economically carried on in some location where it would give no
offense.,' 29 Therefore, the more rural the area - that is, the fewer the residents
to be offended by a use - the less likely that there is a less offensive place for
the necessary activity, and the less likely the rural residents will be able to have
the activity enjoined.
On the other side of the balance, more intensive uses typical of urbanization may often be much more financially valuable. Therefore, courts may be
less likely to enjoin urbanizing uses in rural areas and instead award only damages.30 Sometimes courts have expressly justified this result on the ground that
public policy favors urbanization. 3'
This equitable rule limiting injunctive relief further favors urban uses
over rural uses and effectively gives urbanizing uses the power to enter rural
areas and forcibly buy the property rights of objecting rural land owners. This
"balancing of equities" implements a sort of urban bias, because uses are more
protected when more people are involved or land is being used more intensively.
Nuisance cases should weigh other values served by less intensive rural uses,
such as diversity of land uses, environmental preservation, open space, and cultural and social values, even though these values are not as readily measured in
monetary terms. 32 Rural areas and uses are valuable and worth preserving even
if not as intensive and not as financially productive.33 Of course, values served
29

Georg v. Animal Def. League, 231 S.W.2d 807, 809-10 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950); see also

Schiller v. Raley, 405 S.W.2d 446, 447 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) (reversing injunction against feed-

lot in part because the area was "a sparsely settled farming and ranching area" and the feedlot was
a "useful and necessary business" that "would be subject to objection and complaint wherever it
was located in the county").
30
See Lee v. Bowles, 397 S.W.2d 923, 926-27 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) (affirming denial of
injunction against race track in rural area in part because "the public generally would benefit from
the operation of this track, both from a standpoint of recreational value and as an economic asset"). But see Guarina. 180 A.2d at 560 ("[A] rural area is equally adaptable to the operations of a
fireworks factory or a dynamite plant or even a missile testing ground. However, the sole criterion of propriety and legality for the erection and operation of any particular business is not the
utilitarian value and profit-making potentialities the business offers its owner but its general setting of good in the whole living panorama of society ...

)

I

See Storey v. Cent. Hide & Rendering Co., 226 S.W.2d 615. 619 (Tex. 1950) ("'Some one
must suffer these inconveniences rather than that the public interest should suffer. * * * These
conflicting interests call for a solution of the question by the application of the broad principles of
right and justice, leaving the individual to his remedy by compensation and maintaining the public

interests intact; this works hardships on the individual, but they are incident to civilization with its
physical developments, demanding more and more the means of rapid transportation of persons
and property."' (quoting 31 Tex. Jur. 448, Nuisances § 35)).

32 See Guarina, 180 A.2d at 561 ("'Where justice is properly administered rights are never
measured by their mere money value, neither are wrongs tolerated because it may be to the advantage of the powerful to impose upon the weak.'" (quoting Appeal of Pennsylvania Lead Co., 96
Pa. 116 (1880)).
3

See James B. Wadley & Pamela Falk, Lucas and Environmental Land Use Controls in Ru-

ral Areas: Whose Land Is It Anyway?, 19 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 331, 351 (1993) ("[1]n rural
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by rural uses must still be weighed against values served by competing uses, and
balancing such different values may be hard. But they should still be recognized and considered.
D.

Right to Farm Laws

The balancing disadvantage may be even worse for rural nuisance defendants than for rural nuisance plaintiffs. Rural uses are generally less intensive and so may be valued less. And they may cause significant external impacts on encroaching urban and suburban uses that are more intensive and have
higher market value.34
Some courts have been sensitive to this problem and protected rural
uses from nuisance claims when the claimant came to the area knowing the character of the area and existing uses. 35 However, it seems most modern courts
take a more flexible approach to this situation and may still hold that the prior
rural use is a nuisance. Courts have often justified the apparent unfairness on
the grounds that the community's "material prosperity" depends on "the continued growth and enlargement of manufacturing36of diverse varieties," or whatever
the newer, more economically valuable use is.
Such decisions present a special risk for agricultural uses, which are often incompatible with encroaching development. In response, all states have
passed "right-to-farm" laws which help protect agricultural uses from nuisance
suits resulting from encroaching development.3 7 One common approach is to
areas, land serves significant noneconomic social purposes. Accordingly, noneconomic interests
should be entitled to equal merit and legal protections as economic considerations.").
3
See, e.g.. Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 704-05 (Ariz. 1972)
(describing impacts of feedlot on encroaching retirement community and holding that feedlot was
a nuisance).
35
See Dill v. Excel Packing Co., 331 P.2d 539. 548 (Kan. 1958) ("Plaintiffs chose to live in an
area uncontrolled by zoning laws or restrictive covenants and remote from urban development. In
such an area plaintiffs cannot complain that legitimate agricultural pursuits are being carried on in
the vicinity, nor can plaintiffs, having chosen to build in an agricultural area, complain that the
agricultural pursuits carried on in the area depreciate the value of their homes. The area being
primarily agricultural, an opinion reflecting the value of such property must take this factor into

account. The standards affecting the value of residence property in an urban setting, subject to
zoning controls and controlled planning techniques, cannot be the standards by which agricultural
properties are judged.").
36
Stevens v. Rockport Granite Co., 104 N.E. 371, 373 (Mass. 1914); see, eg, Spur Indus.,
494 P.2d at 707 (holding that prior cattle feedlot was a nuisance interfering with newer retirement
community).
3
See Davis v. Taylor, 132 P.3d 783, 784-85 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006) ("The right-to-farm act
was a direct response to the urbanization of rural communities and the increase in nuisance actions
related to 'agricultural activities conducted on farmland.'"); Jacqueline P. Hand, Right-to-Farm
Laws: Breaking New Ground in the Preservationof Farmland,45 U. PITT. L. REv. 289, 297-98
& n.46 (1984); National Agricultural Law Center, States' Right-To-Farm Statutes,
http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/righttofarm/index.html (last visited Feb. 24. 2010)
(providing text of right-to-farm statutes in all 50 states).
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declare by statute that properly conducted agricultural activities will not be considered nuisances to subsequently established non-agricultural activities in the
area, unless perhaps the plaintiffs overcome a presumption that legal agricultural
activities do not substantially adversely affect the public health and safety.3 8
These statutes thus counter the tendency of nuisance law to favor more intensive, and thus more economically valuable, uses. Of course, right-to-farm laws
apply only in relatively narrow, specific circumstances, and when those circumstances are not present, the usual balancing approach of nuisance law applies.39
Another statutory approach to protect agricultural uses from nuisance
claims is to impose a short limitations period on nuisance actions against agri40
cultural operations, running from the establishment of the agricultural use.
The result is that once an agricultural operation has been in effect for the specified period, it cannot be held to be a nuisance regardless of the balance of values, and regardless of whether the plaintiff's use preceded the agricultural operation.
The right-to-farm laws are a precedent and model for legislative intervention to address failures of the common law to respond effectively to rural
circumstances. They recognize that there are important reasons to preserve a
certain class of rural uses, agricultural uses, even though the usual policy considerations reflected in nuisance law might often result in favoring nonagricultural uses.41 Of course, these statutes protect agricultural uses against not only
38

See, e.g.,

CAL.

CIv.

CODE

§ 3482.5(a)(1) (Deering 2005) ("No agricultural activity, opera-

tion, or facility, or appurtenances thereof, conducted or maintained for commercial purposes, and
ina manner consistent with proper and accepted customs and standards, as established and followed by similar agricultural operations in the same locality, shall be or become a nuisance, private or public, due to any changed condition in or about the locality, after it has been in operation
for more than three years if it was not a nuisance at the time it began."): WASH. REV. CODE ANN.

§ 7.48.305 (West 2007) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, agricultural activities conducted on farmland and forest practices, if consistent with good agricultural and forest
practices and established prior to surrounding nonagricultural and nonforestry activities, are presumed to be reasonable and shall not be found to constitute a nuisance unless the activity has a
substantial adverse effect on the public health and safety. If those agricultural activities and forest
practices are undertaken in conformity with all applicable laws and rules, the activities are pre-

sumed to be good agricultural and forest practices not adversely affecting the public health and
safety ....
");Finlay v. Finlay, 856 P.2d 183, 187 88 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993).
3
See Finlay, 856 P.2d at 189 ("Since Kansas 'Right to Farm' statutes are inapplicable, this
case must be resolved using traditional concepts of nuisance as they relate to farmland.").
40
See, e.g.. MISS. CODE ANN.§ 95-3-29(1) (2004) ("In any nuisance action, public or private,
against an agricultural operation. proof that said agricultural operation has existed for one (1) year
or more is an absolute defense to such action, if the conditions or circumstances alleged to constitute a nuisance have existed substantially unchanged since the established date of operation.").
41
See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 2-3201 (2001) ("It is the declared policy of this state to conserve and protect and encourage the development and improvement of farmland for the production
of food and other agricultural products. The legislature finds that agricultural activities conducted

on farmland in areas in which nonagricultural uses have moved into agricultural areas are often
subjected to nuisance lawsuits, and that such suits encourage and even force the premature remov-
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urbanization, but against any competing uses even if they are equally rural in
character.42 The statutes that protect only previously existing agricultural uses
43
are clearly intended to protect agricultural uses from urbanization, but even
they do not attempt to discriminate between claims by other types of rural uses
and claims by urbanizing uses. So they reflect public concern about preserving
agricultural uses, not rural uses generally. But they correct some undesirable
outcomes of the common law balancing approach, and they suggest a way to
correct other undesirable outcomes that result from undervaluing rural uses.
E.

Injury to Landscape

One particular type of injury, injury to scenic values, may not be
weighed at all. A nuisance is commonly described as a substantial and unreasonable interference with the private use and enjoyment of one's land. 44 Ugly,
inappropriate, or obstructing improvements to land certainly may substantially
interfere with people enjoying their land. Yet courts have often held that aesthetic offenses cannot be nuisances. 45 A typical case held that a lumber yard in
a residential area was not a nuisance, reasoning:
[T]he law will not declare a thing a nuisance because it is unsightly or disfigured, because it is not in a proper or suitable
condition, or because it is unpleasant to the eye and a violation
of the rules of propriety and good taste, for the law does not cater to men's tastes or consult their convenience merely, but only
guards and upholds their material rights ..... 4
This rule applies to urban and rural properties alike, but it may especially hurt rural property owners. First, the personal and market value of rural
property may be more likely to include value from the surrounding unaltered
landscape. As one nuisance case acknowledged, "[u]nobstructed sunsets, panoramic landscapes, and starlit skies have inspired countless artists and authors
and have brought great pleasure to those fortunate enough to live in scenic rural

al of the lands from agricultural uses."); Bowen v. Flaherty, 601 So. 2d 860, 863 (Miss. 1992)
("[E]mbedded within the language the Legislature has provided, is a rational policy judgment that
farming operations are important to this state's welfare and ought be protected from nuisance

actions once they have been in existence and operation for the prescribed period of time.").
See Bowen, 601 So. 2d 860 (holding that right-to-farm statute barred nuisance claim by rural
homeowner against cotton gin that was established after homeowner built his home).
43
See Davis v. Taylor, 132 P.3d 783, 785 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006) ("The legislature intended
that the right-to-farm act be applied narrowly to protect only those farms in 'urbanizing areas."').
42

44

See W. PAGE

KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS §

86 (5th ed. 1984).
See Robert D. Dodson, Rethinking Private Nuisance Law: Recognizing Aesthetic Nuisances
in the New Millennium, 10 S.C. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 2 (2002) (citing cases).
46
Shamburger v. Scheurrer, 198 S.W. 1069, 1071 72 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917).
45
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settings. 4 7 Second, even if all property values were equally affected by the
quality of the surrounding landscape, less intensively developed property might
generally owe a higher proportion of its value to the landscape. In some cases,
the primary appeal of undeveloped rural property may be the beauty of the surroundings. In Rankin v. FPL Energy, LLC, for example, one plaintiff testified
that "she and her husband had purchased their land to build a home and to have
a place 'for strength, for rest, for hope, for joy, for security - for release.'
48
They had plans for building and operating a small bed and breakfast ....
A
wind farm built nearby ruined the landscape and their plans. And finally, while
zoning ordinances and other public regulations will often provide some protection against certain kinds of aesthetic offenses, such regulations are less common in rural areas.
As the passage quoted above indicates, one response to aesthetic nuisance claims has been that, even though a property's value may be significantly
affected by the surrounding beauty, the law does not protect "taste" or "convenience., 49 This is not a good explanation for why offensive odors or sounds may
be nuisances, but offensive sights may not be. Whatever differences there may
be between light, sound, and odor, the potential offense is sensory. 50 Some cases stress the physical effects that unpleasant noises and odors may have, whereas unpleasant sights might not cause the same effects. But such physical effects have not been required in order to prove that noises or odors are nuisances. 51 The ultimate question is the same: does the undesirable sound, smell,
or sight unreasonably interfere with the use and enjoyment of land?
Another explanation for denying aesthetic nuisance claims might be that
unpleasant sights can be more readily avoided than unpleasant sounds or
smells.5 2 But the question is not how easily the landowner can avoid the imposition, but whether that activity substantially interferes with use and enjoyment
of the land. A property owner may look away, but the offensive activity may
nevertheless substantially interfere with the owner's use and enjoyment of the
53
land. In Rankin, for example, the rural owners could no longer use their prop47
48

49

Rankin v. FPL Energy, LLC, 266 S.W.3d 506, 512 (Tex. Civ. App. 2008).
Id. at 511.
Shamburger, 198 S.W. at 1072: see also Dodson. supra note , at 2 ("[M]any courts have

indicated that unsightly or unaesthetic land uses cannot produce substantial interference with the
use and enjoyment of another's land.").
50
See Raymond Robert Coletta, The Case for Aesthetic Nuisance: Rethinking Traditional

JudicialAttitudes, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 141. 166 (1987) (arguing that "there is no physiological reason
for treating visual perceptions any differently from noise or smell").
51 See id. at 168 ("[E]ven assuming that the potential for physical harm can sometimes distinguish noise and odor invasions, nuisance theory is not founded on physical injury.").
52 See Dodson, supra note , at 5 ("Perhaps part of the reason courts have treated aesthetic
nuisance actions differently from other more typical nuisance cases is the fact that unpleasant
sights. unlike noises or odors, can be readily avoided.").
53 See Allison v. Smith, 695 P.2d 791, 794 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984) ("[L]egitimate but unsightly
activity ... may become a private nuisance if it is ... unduly offensive to its neighbors, particular-
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erty for a bed and breakfast because it wasn't a desirable destination anymore.
Market value may be impaired because the aesthetic nuisance makes some uses
no longer as desirable.5 4
Some courts have also rejected aesthetic nuisances because courts can't
objectively determine what is aesthetically offensive.55 But this reasoning
seems to forget that an activity is not a nuisance because it is inherently objectionable, but because it unreasonably interferes with another's land use, in light
of the character of the location, the importance of the uses, and so on. 56 Just as
with sounds or smells, courts should not decide whether something is ugly, but
whether it would substantially interfere with the enjoyment of land by a normal
landowner in the area.57 The surrounding landscape certainly can substantially
affect the market value of property, and such market effects can be objectively
determined.58
Here, too, legislation can help protect interests that the common law
may not. For examples, courts have sustained local ordinances that have preserved mountain views, 59 prohibited chain link fences, 60 required approval of
ly when it is located in a residential district."); Coletta, supra note , at 167 ("[V]isual dissonance
can create substantial interference with an individual's use and enjoyment of property.... Aesthetic dysfunctions can . . . directly affect the individual's physical, social, and psychological
well-being as much as, or even more than, other sensory intrusions.").
54
See Allison, 695 P.2d at 795 (sustaining award of lost market value due to junk on neighboring property); Dodson, supra note , at 6-9 (arguing that diminution in property value evidences
substantial interference with use and enjoyment, and citing examples).
55
See, e.g., Green v. Castle Concrete Co., 509 P.2d 588, 591 (Colo. 1973) (en banc)
("[A]lthough the goal of creating an aesthetically pleasing environment is clearly laudable, it is
equally clear that where the accomplishment of this goal entails the restructuring of societal rights
and priorities it cannot be fairly or justly done through a judicially sanctioned private condemnation without compensation under the guise of abating a nuisance. .... Given our myriad and disparate tastes, life styles. mores, and attitudes, the availability of a judicial remedy for such complaints would cause inexorable confusion.") Wernke v. Halas, 600 N.E.2d 117. 122 (Ind. Ct. App.
1992) (reversing finding of aesthetic nuisance, reasoning that "[a]esthetic values are inherently
subjective" and courts should not be "the arbiters of proper aesthetics and good taste") Coletta,
supra note, at 146-48 (discussing cases).
56
See Coletta, supra note, at 172 75; George P. Smith. 1i & Griffin W. Fernandez, The Price
of Beauty: An Economic Approach to Aesthetic Nuisance, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 53, 68 69

(1991) ("Rather than formulating the problem at hand as one of interpreting objective aesthetic
standards, judges have erroneously seen their task as enforcing their own sense of the beautiful
and the ugly. This misunderstanding, rather than the nature of the aesthetic, prompts judges to
shun aesthetic nuisance actions. To reject the right to be free from a purely aesthetic but injurious
use of land on the assumption that a judge must decide an aesthetic nuisance case solely on the
basis of her own aesthetic sensibilities is clearly flawed reasoning.").
57
See Foley v. Harris, 286 S.E.2d 186, 190-91 (Va. 1982) (stating that "discomfort and annoyance" from unsightly land uses may result in a nuisance if they are "significant and of a kind
that would be suffered by a normal person in the community"); Smith & Fernandez, supra note,
at 71-72.
58
See Smith & Fernandez, supra note, at 75-76 (discussing market valuation of the effects of
aesthetic nuisances).
59
Landmark Land Co. v. City & County of Denver, 728 P.2d 1281 (Colo. 1986).
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building design to preserve local atmosphere and harmony and avoid ugly or
inappropriate structures, 1 prohibited clotheslines in front and side yards,62 pro63
64
hibited or restricted junkyards, and regulated signs.
Such regulations do not
make nuisance protection unnecessary, however, because they target specific
aesthetic concerns rather than protecting the interest in aesthetic qualities generally. But if legislatures can prohibit particular land uses because they are aesthetically objectionable, individual owners should likewise have the right to
prevent aesthetically objectionable uses that substantially and unreasonably interfere with their property use and enjoyment.
ii. LANDLORD-TENANT LAW

Almost all courts have come to agree that a landlord implicitly warrants
the habitability of residential premises.65 The nature of the lease transaction
implies a promise by the landlord that the property has and will continue to have
"adequate heat, light and ventilation, serviceable plumbing facilities, secure
windows and doors, proper sanitation and proper maintenance. 6 6
A prominent explanation for the emergence of the implied warranty of
habitability is a societal change from rural to urban. As the court in Javins v.
FirstNationalRealty Corp. explained in adopting the implied warranty:
The assumption of landlord-tenant law, derived from feudal
property law, that a lease primarily conveyed to the tenant an
interest in land may have been reasonable in a rural, agrarian
society; it may continue to be reasonable in some leases involving farming or commercial land. In these cases, the value of the
lease to the tenant is the land itself. But in the case of the modern apartment dweller, the value of the lease is that it gives him
a place to live. The city dweller who seeks to lease an apart60

City of Smyrna v. Parks, 242 S.E.2d 73, 77 (Ga. 1978) ("Even if the ground of safety is

deemed a tenuous one, however, the ordinance would not be an unwarranted exercise of police
power based on aesthetics alone .... ").
61
E.g.. State ex rel. Stoyanoff v. Berkeley. 458 S.W.2d 305 (Mo. 1970): Town of Deering ex
rel. Bittenbender v. Tibbetts, 202 A.2d 232 (N.H. 1964).
62
People v. Stover, 191 N.E.2d 272 (N.Y. 1963).
63
E.g., State v. Jones, 290 S.E.2d 675 (N.C. 1982); Oregon City v. Hartke, 400 P.2d 255 (Or.
1965) (en banc); State v. Smith, 618 S.W.2d 474 (Tenn. 1981).
See Kenneth Pearlman et al., Beyond the Eye of the Beholder Once Again: A New Review of
Aesthetic Regulation, 38 URB. LAW. 1119 (2006) (citing many cases).
65
Tom G. Guerts, The HistoricalDevelopment of the Lease in Residential Real Estate, 32
REAL EST. L.J. 356, 372 n.106 (2004) (identifying only four states
Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado. and Wyoming
that had not recognized the implied warranty of habitability): see also ALA.
CODE § 35-9A-204(a) (2007); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-12-503 (2008); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-211202 to - 1203 (2009).
66
Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
64
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ment on the third floor of a tenement has little interest in the
land 30 or 40 feet below, or even in the bare right to possession
within the four walls of his apartment. When American city
dwellers, both rich and poor, seek 'shelter' today, they seek a
well known package of goods and services ....
Not only was a rural lease thought to be primarily for land rather than
housing, the rural tenant was thought to be more capable of maintaining rented
housing in a habitable condition:
It was assumed that landlords and tenants held equal bargaining
power in arranging their rental agreements, and that the agrarian
tenant had the ability to inspect the dwelling adequately and to
make simple repairs in the buildings which possessed no modern conveniences such as indoor plumbing or electrical wiring. 68
This perceived difference between rural and urban tenants presumably
accounts for different treatment of rural tenants in some cases. Some judicial
opinions suggest that because urban conditions gave rise to the implied warranty, courts should only apply the warranty when such conditions are present. For
example, one judge wrote:
While states which are considered more predominantly rural
than urban have adopted an implied covenant of habitability,
their adoptions are not considered "leading" decisions. In fact,
it is rare to find a rural state case applying a covenant of habitability to afford a tenant relief when conditions similar to those
existing in urban areas have not been demonstrated. This in no
way implies that only tenants in urban areas deserve the protection of a covenant of habitability, but rather only that the conditions leading to adoption of the implied covenant in urban areas
are the type of conditions which we should keep in mind in developing the proper application of the covenant in future cases.

69

Many states have adopted the warranty of habitability by statute. At
least one of those statutes, in Tennessee, also treats rural landlords and tenants
differently. Tennessee's landlord-tenant act does not apply in counties with
67

Id.

68

Pugh v. Holmes, 384 A.2d 1234, 1237 38 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978); see also Javins, 428 F.2d

at 1079 ("Furthermore, today's city dweller usually has a single. specialized skill unrelated to
maintenance work; he is unable to make repairs like the jack-of-all-trades' farmer who was the
common law's model of the lessee.").
69
Teller v. McCoy, 253 S.E.2d 114. 132 (W. Va. 1979) (Neely, J.. concurring in part).
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The Tennessee Court of Appeals sustained this

It is highly probable that populations are crowded into rental
properties in urban areas. The Legislature has determined that
there is a need for greater restrictions in landlord/tenant relationships in crowded urban areas. In addition, large metropolitan areas historically have greater numbers of residents on public assistance and in low income housing. Uniform rules are arguably needed to establish guidelines for landlord/tenant responsibilities, to provide a modicum of protection to tenants
who cannot readily procure legal services, and to reduce the filing of lawsuits in already overcrowded municipal dockets. 1
Rural tenants' habitability claims may also be disadvantaged in several
ways by the absence of building and housing codes. Building and housing code
violations are commonly treated as violations, or at least evidence of violations,
of the implied warranty. 72 Such codes therefore improve the chances of a tenant
bringing and winning a claim for breach of the warranty of habitability. In fact,
some have suggested that breach of the implied warranty of habitability requires
proof of a violation of a building or housing code,73 although most courts agree
70

TENN. CODE ANN.§ 66-28-102(a)(1) (1993 & Supp. 2003). Tennessee is the only state that

has adopted but limited the URLTA in this way. Ashby Richbourg Scott, Note. The Tennessee
Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act
"A Hodge-Podge of Statutory Exclusions," 34
U. MEM. L. REV. 903, 917 (2004).
71
Crawford v. Buckner, No. 158, 1991 WL 127626, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 16. 1991),
rev'd on other grounds, 839 S.W.2d 754 (Tenn. 1992).
72
See, e.g., Steele v. Latimer, 521 P.2d 304, 309 (Kan. 1974) ("Building codes are common
today in many urban centers throughout the United States and the modern weight of authority in
this country appears to be that the minimum standards embraced within a housing ordinance,
building code or other municipal regulation are to be read into and will be implied by operation of
law in housing contracts."): Boston Housing Auth. v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831, 844 n.16
(Mass. 1973) ("Proof of any violation of these regulations would usually constitute compelling
evidence that the apartment was not in habitable condition, regardless of whether the evidence
was sufficient proof of a constructive eviction under our old case law."); Park West Mgmt. Corp.
v. Mitchell, 391 N.E.2d 1288, 1294 (N.Y. 1979) ("Substantial violation of a housing, building or
sanitation code provides a bright-line standard capable of uniform application and, accordingly,
constitutes prima facie evidence that the premises are not in habitable condition." ); Hilder v. St.
Peter, 478 A.2d 202. 208 (Vt. 1984) ("A substantial violation of an applicable housing code shall
constitute prima facie evidence that there has been a breach of the warranty of habitability.");
Foisy v. Wyman. 515 P.2d 160, 166 (Wash. 1973) (en banc) ("While the housing code violations
in and of themselves do not establish a prima facie case that the premises are uninhabitable, they
are evidence which aids in establishing that the premises are uninhabitable.").
73
See Dapkunas v. Cagle, 356 N.E.2d 575. 579 (111. App. Ct. 1976) ("By way of contrast,
however, in the instant case plaintiffs fifth amended complaint made no allegation of a violation
of an applicable building code; nor did it even allege that a building code was in effect in Johnston
City, Illinois. It can hardly be assumed, therefore, that plaintiff's oral lease incorporated the provision of a building code just as if such provisions had been enumerated by the parties."); Boston
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that a code violation is not necessary. 4 Therefore, if a community does not
have an applicable building or housing code, tenants may not have any potential
claim for breach of the implied warranty of habitability, or even if they do, it
may be more difficult to prevail without proof of a code violation.
Furthermore, many habitability cases have reasoned that applicable
building and housing codes are part of the lease. Therefore, the tenant cannot
waive the warranty of habitability because it is required by the code and not just
the parties' private agreement. 75 But if there is no applicable code, some courts
have concluded that the implied warranty may be waived, or even that there is
no implied warranty concerning uninhabitable conditions of the premises that
were reasonably apparent to the tenant. '76 Consequently, a tenant in a locality
without an applicable code may have less protection than a tenant in a locality
with a code.
Unsurprisingly, rural communities are less likely to have building and
housing codes.7 7 Even when they do have such codes, they may be less restric-

Housing Auth., 293 N.E.2d at 852-53 (Quirico, J., concurring in part) (discussing habitability
cases and emphasizing breach is based on violation of applicable statutes and regulations).
74
See Glasoe v. Trinkle, 479 N.E.2d 915, 918-19 (Il1. 1985) (reversing lower court and holding that "the implied warranty of habitability applies to all leases of residential real estate regardless of the existence of housing or building codes"); Boston Housing Auth., 293 N.E.2d at 844
n.16; Pugh v. Holmes, 405 A.2d 897, 906 (Pa. 1979) (stating that "the existence of housing code
violations is only one of several evidentiary considerations" in an implied warranty of habitability
claim).
75 See, e.g., Boston Housing Auth., 293 N.E.2d at 843 ("This warranty (in so far as it is based
on the State Sanitary Code and local health regulations) cannot be waived by any provision in the
lease or rental agreement.").
76
See, e.g., Breezewood Mgmt. Co. v. Maltbie, 411 N.E.2d 670, 675 & n.2 (Ind. Ct. App.
1980) (holding that landlord breached implied warranty because premises violated housing code,
but noting that "if parties enter into a lease outside of the purview of a local housing ordinance or
code, and the premises are not substantially other than what they appear to be, this court will treat
that lease agreement as it does any other contract. Thus, if a farmer rents a hovel, and a renter
wants to rent it 'as is,' we will not interfere with the parties' reasonable expectations by allowing
the renter to subsequently file an action against the farmer for breach of certain implied warranties
of habitability .... As long as the premises are not in a substantially different condition than they
appear, this court favors upholding the reasonable expectations of the parties").
77
See Pugh. 405 A.2d at 906 n.3 (noting that many small boroughs and townships had not
adopted housing codes): Robert B. Keiter, The Law of Fire: Reshaping Public Land Policy in an
Era of Ecology and Litigation.36 ENVTL. L. 301. 364 (2006) (noting the "historic rural resistance
to zoning and other land-use restrictions"); Eric Damian Kelly, Fair Housing, Good Housing or
Expensive Housing? Are Building Codes Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?, 29 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 349, 350-51 (1996) (noting studies indicating that smaller cities are less likely
to have building codes, and counties are less likely to have building codes than cities); Kathryn
Hake, Comment, Is Home Where Arkansas's Heart Is?: State Adopts Unique Statutory Approach
to Landlord Tort Liability and Maintains Common Law "Caveat Lessee," 59 ARiK. L. REv. 737,
738 (2006) ("Not all Arkansas cities have housing codes, and there are no housing codes in rural,
unincorporated areas.").
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tive. 78 In some states, smaller communities do not even have the power to adopt
such codes. For example, the West Virginia Code gives only counties with a
population of 45,000 or more the power "to adopt building and housing codes
establishing and regulating minimum building and housing standards for the
purpose of improving the health, safety and well-being of its citizens.,, 79 But
even if rural towns and counties have the power to adopt such codes, they are
less likely to have done so, perhaps because of lack of resources for adopting
such codes, less pressure from tenants, or even their own assumption that such
things aren't needed in a small community because people can work things out
better on their own without legal help.
But the warranty of habitability should be applied just as readily to rural
landlords as urban landlords. Even if contrary assumptions about rural tenants
were once true, today rural tenants who rent houses are expecting and depending
upon habitable homes just as much as urban tenants. There is no reason to think
rural home renters have more practical skills to inspect and repair the home either." o

In some ways, the need and justification for the implied warranty may
be even greater in rural settings. The implied warranty of habitability has been
explained as an assumption about the parties' expectations, 81 but many courts
have held that the warranty cannot be waived, regardless of whether tenants
know what they are waiving.8 2 Prohibiting even a knowing waiver emphasizes
that the warranty is based not just on parties' intentions, but also on a public
policy to ensure decent housing - the policy reflected in building and housing
codes. 83 Today, rural housing is more likely to be substandard than urban hous-

78

See Katherine MacTavish, Housing Vulnerability Among Rural Trailer-ParkHouseholds,

13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 95, 97 (2006) ("[R]ural zoning and housing codes are notoriously more lax than city codes.").
79
W. VA. CODE § 7-1-3n(a) (2009); see also Teller v. McCoy, 253 S.E.2d 114, 121 (W. Va.
1978).
80

See Pruitt, supra note , at 236 ("Tenants in [rural] states now more often rent a home in

which to live rather than fields in which to grow crops. The average tenant no longer has the
practical skills needed to inspect and repair his dwelling. Judges must respond to these realities.").
s
See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ("Since a
lease contract specifies a particular period of time during which the tenant has a right to use his
apartment for shelter, he may legitimately expect that the apartment will be fit for habitation for
the time period for which it is rented.").
82

See, e.g., I MILTON R.

FRIEDMAN, FRIEDMAN ON LEASES

§ 10.101, at 498 & n.18 (2d ed.

1983).
83

See, e.g., Javins, 428 F.2d at 1079 80 (noting, among other reasons for the implied warran-

ty. the "increasingly severe shortage of adequate housing" and that "poor housing is detrimental to
the whole society. not merely to the unlucky ones who must suffer the daily indignity of living in
a slum"); Pines v. Perssion, 111 NW.2d 409, 412-13 (Wis. 1961) ("To follow the old rule of no
implied warranty of habitability in leases would, in our opinion, be inconsistent with the current
legislative policy concerning housing standards. . . . Permitting landlords to rent 'tumbledown'
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ing. 4 Furthermore, even if some continue to believe that rural tenants have
more practical skills to make their housing more habitable themselves, it takes
more than skills to repair and maintain housing. It takes money for tools and
materials too, and as a group, rural renters may have a harder time affording
tools and materials because they spend an especially high percentage of their
income on housing. 85 So to whatever extent we impose the warranty of habitability on landlords to help ensure decent housing, the need may be even greater
in rural areas. To whatever degree implied warranty protection is less available
to rural tenants, it seems to be another example of the law being influenced by
rural assumptions and stereotypes rather than rural realities. But perhaps
to
s6
some degree it also reflects lack of attention to rural needs and issues.
III. ADVERSE POSSESSION
Adverse possession law generally is sensitive to real differences be-

tween rural and urban places. Although the list of elements varies, acquiring
title by adverse possession generally requires actual, open, notorious, hostile,
exclusive, and continuous use for the adverse possession period.87 The application of most of these elements has differed between rural and urban places. Oddly, however, some courts seem to recognize how certain rural qualities may
houses is at least a contributing cause of such problems as urban blight, juvenile delinquency and
high property taxes for conscientious landowners.").
84

See JANET M. FITCHEN, ENDANGERED SPACES. ENDURING PLACES: CHANGE, IDENTITY, AND

SURVIVAL IN RURAL AMERICA 135 36 (1991) ("Housing quality in rural America is actually worse

than in urban America ...and is worst of all among rental rural housing."): Ezra Rosser, Rural
Housing and Code Enforcement: Navigating Between Values and Housing Types. 13 GEO. J. ON
POVERTY L. & POL'Y 33, 34 n.3 (2006) ("Renter-occupied households in rural areas are twice as
likely to live in substandard housing than their owner counterparts." (quoting HOUSING
ASSISTANCE

COUNCIL,

RENTAL

HOUSING

IN

RURAL

AMERICA,

Apr.

2003,

http://www.ruralhome.org/manager/uploads/RuralRental.pdf)); cf Guadalupe T. Luna, Immigrants, Cops and Slumlords in the Midwest, 29 S.ILL. U. L.J. 61, 70-72 (2005) (describing uninhabitable conditions of farmworker housing); J. Dennis Murray & Peter A. Keller, Psychology
and Rural America: Current Status and Future Directions, 46 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 220. 222
(1991) ("[R]ural people in the United States are three times as likely to live in substandard housing as are their urban counterparts.").
85
"Even though the federal goverment considers spending 30 percent of household income
on housing to be 'affordable,' 65 percent of non-metropolitan homeowners and 79 percent of nonmetropolitan renters spend more than that amount." Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Ignoring the
Rural Underclass: The Biases of FederalHousing Policy. 2 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 191, 204 n.14
(1990); id. at 193 ("An alarming 32 percent of poor non-metropolitan renters and 22 percent of
poor non-metropolitan homeowners spend more than 70 percent of their income for housing."); cf
Housing Assistance Council, Rural Housing Data Portal, http://216.92.48.246/dataportal (last
visited Feb. 28, 2010) (reporting 1999 and 2003 data showing a higher percentage of rural poverty
than urban poverty).
86
Some might argue that building and housing codes would injure rural tenants by making
housing more expensive or less available. See generally Rosser, supra note.
87
See, e.g., Clark v. Aukerman, 654 N.E.2d 1183, 1185 (Ind.Ct. App. 1995).
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affect the possessor's conduct, but overlook or disregard how those same qualities may likewise affect the title owner's conduct.
A.

Actual Possession

Actually possessing land may differ between urban and rural settings.
The adverse possession claimant must have done more than simply use the
property; she must have possessed it as an owner would have possessed it.88
But a rural landowner may use the land differently than an urban landowner.
The court therefore must consider the character of the land in deciding whether
a possessor has acted as an owner. As one court put it:
Because every piece of property is unique, each adverse possession case must be decided in light of its own unique circumstances. Much depends on the location, the character, and the
use to which the land in question may reasonably be put. Those
specific manifestations of possession and ownership exhibited
by a claimant which would support a finding of title by adverse
possession in a populous and highly developed area are not the
same as those which would support such a finding where the
property is sparsely populated farmland.8 9
Many courts have reasoned that rural land may be used less intensively
than developed urban land and have therefore held that less substantial physical
activities constitute actual possession of rural land. 90 Courts have found a variety of less substantial acts to be sufficient possession of undeveloped rural land,
although generally in combination, including: grazing animals; 9' clearing
88

See, e.g., Howe v. Natale, 451 A.2d 1198. 1200 (Me. 1982) ("Possession is established

when the evidence shows an actual use and enjoyment of the property which is in kind and degree
the same as the use and enjoyment to be expected of the average owner of such property.").
89
Harris v. Lynch. 940 S.W.2d 42. 45 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
90
See, e.g., McCarty v. Sheets, 423 N.E.2d 297, 300 (Ind. 1981) ("Cases of adverse possession must, of necessity, be decided on a case by case basis, for what constitutes possession of a
'wild' land may not constitute possession of a residential lot, just as possession of the latter may
not constitute possession of a commercial lot."); Secret Cove, L.L.C. v. Thomas, 862 So. 2d 1010,
1019 (La. Ct. App. 2003) ("The quality of possession required ... in a particular case depends
upon the type of land in dispute. The land involved in this case is wild, undeveloped, rural property ....

); Lynn v. Soterra Inc.. 802 So. 2d 162. 167 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001) ("Adverse possession

of 'wild' or unimproved lands may be established by evidence of acts that would be wholly insufficient in the case of improved or developed lands."); Alexandra B. Klass, Adverse Possessionand
Conservation: Expanding TraditionalNotions of Use and Possession, 77 U. COLO. L. REv. 283,
292 (2006) (citing cases).
9'
See Clark, 654 N.E.2d at 1186 87 ("From the time Aukerman took possession, he has continuously repaired and upgraded the fence. Aukerman purchased cattle, which grazed in the pas-

ture and sheltered in the wooded area near the fence. Aukerman improved the disputed area by
installing drain tiles, bulldozing the brush, and planting hay. We agree with the trial court that
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94
93
brush; 92 using timber, sand, or other products of the land; recreational use;
and clearing boundaries and posting signs. 95 But certainly some cases have held
such activities insufficient to constitute possession.96 The essential question is
whether the possessor used the land as an owner would use such land. 97

B.

Continuous and UninterruptedPossession

The adverse possession must also be continuous and uninterrupted. 98
Here, too, courts recognize that "[t]he nature of possession sufficient to meet
this requirement depends on the character of the property." 99 The possessor
does not have to be continuously present on the property. 1 0 The essential ques-

these facts were sufficient to prove that Aukerman possessed the land."); Crowley v. Whitesell,
702 S.W.2d 127, 128 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (noting that plaintiff had fenced land, sold some timber
from it, and ran cattle on it, and concluding that "individually these things might not be sufficient
to require a holding of actual possession, [but] together they were sufficient for the trial court to
find actual possession of the land."): Norgard v. Busher, 349 P.2d 490 (Or. 1960) (holding that
pasturing cattle was sufficient actual possession of part of disputed land).
92
See Clark, 654 N.E.2d at 1186-87; Dowdell v. Campbell, No. 2006-CA-002126-MR, 2008
WL 2468719, at *3 (Ky. Ct. App. June 20, 2008) ("We believe maintaining the fence and the
immediate area around it, cleaning out undergrowth on the Property, storing items on the Property. and using it for recreational purposes are clear examples of uses accustomed to rural land that
was originally dense forest.").
93
See Crowley. 702 S.W.2d at 128 (citing timber sales as evidence of possession) Secret
Cove, 862 So. 2d at 1020 (citing, along with recreational use, selling and giving away sand and
gravel as sufficient evidence of possession).
94
See Dowdell, 2008 WL 2468719, at *3; Secret Cove, 862 So. 2d at 1020 ("The Thomases
exercised possession as if they owned the disputed property - giving permission for their friends
to use the property for camping, fishing, and picnicking; allowing people to use the road to access
the sand pile near Jessie Bayou selling or giving away the sand and gravel on the property; tying
up boats and using the waterfront for recreation whenever they pleased and eventually expanding
their commercial campground to include the property."); Zambrotto v. Superior Lumber Co., 4
P.3d 62, 65 (Or. Ct. App. 2000) ("[T]he requirement of 'actual' use is a qualitative one, determined by reference to the type of use that would be made by an owner of the land. Given the
nature of the [rural, mostly forested] land, we conclude that hiking, rattlesnake hunting, and the
like constitute actual use.").
95
See Panter v. Miller, 698 S.W.2d 634, 636 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985) (affirming judgment of
adverse possession of undeveloped rural land based on bulldozing and clearcutting around the
claimed property line and posting signs).
96
See Harris v. Lynch, 940 S.W.2d 42, 46-47 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (observing that Missouri
cases have generally held that grazing cattle is evidence of possession, but insufficient itself to
constitute actual possession); 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession § 48 (2003) (citing cases).
97
See, e.g., Howe v. Natale, 451 A.2d 1198. 1200 (Me. 1982) ("Possession is established
when the evidence shows an actual use and enjoyment of the property which is in kind and degree
the same as the use and enjoyment to be expected of the average owner of such property.").
98
See, e.g., Alaska Nat'l Bank v. Linck, 559 P.2d 1049, 1052 (Alaska 1977).
99

Id.

100 See Manville v. Gronniger, 322 P.2d 789, 793 (Kan. 1958).
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tion is whether the claimant has possessed the land with the kind of continuity
one would expect of an average owner of such property. 10 1
Large tracts of undeveloped rural land might typically be used only for
pasturing animals during certain seasons; therefore, one who uses the land in
such a way has "continuously" possessed the land.102 Likewise, visiting the land
a few times each year to inspect it, clean it, and maintain barricades may be sufficiently continuous possession. 103 Occasionally cutting timber and hunting
have been held
to be sufficiently continuous possession of wild lands suitable
10 4
for such uses.
C.

Exclusive Possession

Similarly, adverse possession must be "exclusive," but owners of undeveloped rural property may exclude others less than urban landowners do. The
owner of undeveloped rural property, for example, might not fence the property.
There are fewer potential intruders, and having others occasionally ride horses
across a pasture, for example, may do no injury at all. 10 5 Some have also suggested that rural owners are more likely to allow others to use their land out of
°6 Whatever the reasons, if the evidence indirural
or neighborliness.
cates custom
that an adverse
possessor of rural
property allowed others to use the land

101 See id.; Ray v. Beacon Hudson Mountain Corp., 666 N.E.2d 532, 535-36 (N.Y. 1996).
102
See, e.g., Cooper v. Carter Oil Co., 316 P.2d 320 (Utah 1957) (holding that pasturing sheep
for three weeks a year was sufficiently continuous). But see Reeves v. Porta, 144 P.2d 493, 496
(Or. 1944) (holding that "occasional pasturing of cows upon a piece of brushy wilderness" was
not sufficiently continuous to give notice to title owner).
103 See Linck, 559 P.2d at 1052 53; Secret Cove, L.L.C. v. Thomas, 862 So. 2d 1010, 1019 (La.
Ct. App. 2003) ("The Thomases did not occupy the disputed property or any part of it on a continuous basis during these years; however, possession does not require them to inhabit the property
or be constantly present on it ....
The evidence shows continuity of their possession during the
years in question by clearing the underbrush, maintaining the road alongside the levee, and developing the campground area."); Ray, 666 N.E.2d at 536 ("[P]laintiffs' actual summertime use for a
full month each season, coupled with their repeated acts of repelling trespassers, improving, posting, padlocking and securing of the property in their absences throughout the statutory period,
demonstrated their continuous dominion and control over, and thus possession of. the property.").
104 See, e.g., Monroe v. Rawlings. 49 N.W.2d 55. 56 (Mich. 1951).
05
See Remund v. Stroud, No. 23264-2-11, 1999 WL 512505, at *5 (Wash. Ct. App. July 16,
1999) (stating that "a true owner of pasture, as a matter of neighborly accommodation, would
permit a neighboring landowner to occasionally ride horses," and therefore was not inconsistent
with exclusive possession).
106
Cf Woodard v. Hasley, No. CA 06-703, 2007 WL 987819, at *2 (Ark. Ct. App. Apr. 4,
2007) (referring to evidence of neighborliness and rural custom); Peters v. Pearl, No. CV 92
0050724 S, 1994 WL 133372, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 6, 1994) (suggesting that an owner
may possess undeveloped rural land less exclusively); Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Bd. of County
Comm'rs, 862 P.2d 428, 440 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993) (in prescriptive easement case, referring to
goal of advancing "good neighborliness and sociability between people living in sparsely settled
or rural areas").
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in ways that are consistent with the possessor's assertion of ownership,
such
10 7
claim.
possession
adverse
an
defeat
not
should
others
by
use
permissive
D.

Open and Notorious Possession

The possession must also be open and notorious, meaning that it must
be sufficiently apparent to give the record owner actual or constructive notice
that someone else is claiming ownership of the land. 10 8 Only some courts have
recognized that, while the character of undeveloped rural land may suggest that
less substantial acts constitute actual possession, the character of undeveloped
rural land also suggests that courts should require those acts of possession to be
more visible and apparent than possession of urban land in order to give constructive notice to the record owner. °9
If adverse possession of undeveloped rural land may be less intensive
and less continuous than adverse possession of urban land, record owners of
such rural land would have to be more diligent in monitoring their property than
urban owners in order to detect such possession. Furthermore, even greater
effort may be required when the land is forested, remote, or otherwise difficult
to monitor.' 10 And while monitoring such rural lands may be significantly more
difficult, owners of such lands may have good reasons to actually monitor the
land less than urban owners. If record owners do not live on the land because it
107 See Lynn v. Soterra, Inc., 802 So. 2d 162, 167-68 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that claimants exclusively possessed property despite allowing others to use road and noting that
"[a]dverse possession of 'wild' or unimproved lands may be established by evidence of acts that
would be wholly insufficient in the case of improved or developed lands").
108
See, e.g., Appalachian Reg'l Healthcare, Inc. v. Royal Crown Bottling Co., 824 S.W.2d 878,

880 (Ky. 1992) (stating that the open and notorious element "requires that the possessor openly
evince a purpose to hold dominion over the property with such hostility that will give the nonpossessory owner notice of the adverse claim"); Flowers v. Roberts, 979 S.W.2d 465. 469 70 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1998) ("The reason the law requires that possession be 'open and notorious' is to afford
the owner reasonable notice, either actual or constructive, that an adverse claim of ownership is
being made by another.").
109
See Flowers, 979 S.W.2d at 471 ("The fact that the land in question is wild, undeveloped
and covered in woods and hills in no way lessens what is required to satisfy the element of possession being 'open and notorious' and, indeed, may very well increase it.").
110 See Luttrell v. Stokes, 77 S.W.3d 745, 749 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002) ("Given that the wilderness
nature of the land may make it more hidden from public view, actions one takes in an effort to be
open and notorious and put a reasonable property owner on notice that an adversarial claim of
ownership is being made may need to be above and beyond those necessary to meet that element
for non-wilderness property."); Moore v. Dudley, 904 S.W.2d 496, 498 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995)
("[T]he disputed land was covered in woods and hills and no extensive clearing or development of
the land ever occurred. The trial court's interpretation of open and notorious may take into account the rough and wooded nature of the land. The trial court had sufficient evidence to conclude the possession was not open and notorious to the extent necessary to establish adverse possession."); Carnevale v. Dupee. 853 A.2d 1197 (R.I. 2004) (reversing trial court's holding that
adverse possession of rural land was not open and notorious because dense vegetation obscured
title owner's view of possessor's fence and mowing on land).
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is undeveloped, recreational, or seasonal, for example, they may have less practical reason to care about intrusions by trespassers. Such intrusions interfere
less with their use and enjoyment and perhaps don't interfere at all. Even if the
intrusions are harmful, the land will likely be much less valuable than urban
land, so the owners have less financial incentive to take action against trespassers. For the same reason, record owners have less incentive to diligently inspect
the property or protect against invasions.
Although courts certainly should apply adverse possession doctrine with
sensitivity to the circumstances of the trespasser's possession, courts should
likewise apply the doctrine with sensitivity to the circumstances of the record
owner's conduct. Although lesser acts of possession may indeed indicate an
assertion of ownership of undeveloped rural land, even a reasonably diligent
owner might not be aware of such activities on the land. One court therefore
reasoned:
Improvements sufficient to apprise the true owners of adverse
possession of wild lands must substantially change the character
of the land. Where the land remains 'wild' after the improvements are completed, no owner should be held to notice of the
improvements. Acts which are consistent with sporadic trespass are insufficient to apprise a reasonably diligent owner of
any adverse claim.'
Some cases seem to recognize how the rural character of land may affect a possessor's use the land, but disregard or minimize how the rural charac-12
ter of land may affect what a reasonable record owner would be aware of."
For example, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that maintaining a fence
and regularly mowing were sufficient acts of ownership of rural land and that
they were sufficiently open and notorious, despite the trial court's finding that
dense vegetation practically prevented the record owners from seeing the fence
or mowed area.1 13 The court reasoned simply that the record owner is charged
with knowledge of whatever is done openly on the land, without consideration

III
112

Pierz v. Gorski, 276 N.W.2d 352, 355 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979) (citations omitted).
See, e.g, Alaska Nat'l Bank v. Linck, 559 P.2d 1049, 1053 (Alaska 1977) ("[A]s with the

other elements of adverse possession, to determine what constitutes sufficient notoriety we must
consider the character of the land. We cannot expect the possessor of uninhabited and forested
land to do what the possessor of urban residential land would do before we charge the record
owner with notice."): Dowdell v. Campbell. 2008 WL 2468719, at *3 (Ky. Ct. App. June 20,
2008) (holding that maintaining fence and fence line. hunting. riding an ATV, clearing walking
trails, storing items, and posting "no trespassing" signs were actual, open and notorious possession
of wooded rural land): Clark v. Ranchero Acres Water Co., 108 P.3d 31, 36 (Or. Ct. App. 2005)
("The test of open and notorious use, however, is whether the adverse possession claimant is
making use of the disputedarea in ways that are consistent with the ordinary use of that property.
It does not concern whether defendant's use of its own property is such that it might not notice.").
113 Carnevale. 853 A.2d at 1200.
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14
of whether a reasonable record owner would have discovered the activity.'
The resulting impression is that one may establish adverse possession of undeveloped rural lands more easily, with less intensive and less frequent use. But
courts should also consider the character of the land and the record owner's use
of the land in deciding whether the adverse possession was sufficient to give
notice to a reasonable owner. If so, proving actual possession of undeveloped
rural lands may be easier, but proving that possession is open and notorious, and
therefore actually prevailing in an adverse possession claim, may be harder.11 5
If the purpose of adverse possession is to encourage capturing value
from land, then this might be an undesirable approach.' 6 Possessors making
good use of land would have a harder time acquiring title. But viewing adverse
possession in such a light itself may reflect a sort of urban perspective, that
more intensive uses are more desirable and should be encouraged and protected.'1 7 As one court observed, such "wild" lands might be more valuable if
they are left open for others to use without fear of losing title to an adverse possessor:

To allow adverse possession based upon such acts would encourage landowners to fence and post their wild land to prevent
usurpation by their neighbors. Public policy favors open use of
wild lands by the public. The law relating to adverse possession
of wild lands ought not force landowners to avoid the risk of
losing their land by denying their neighbors the use and enjoyment of the forest.' 18
Furthermore, if the purpose of adverse possession is not to reward productive use of land by the trespasser, or even to maximize land value, but simp114 Id. at 1201: see also Tavares v. Beck, 814 A.2d 346, 352 53 (R.I. 2003).
115

See Zambrotto v. Superior Lumber Co., 4 P.3d 62, 65-66 (Or. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that

"hiking, rattlesnake hunting, and the like" constituted actual use of "rural, mostly forested property." but also holding that those acts were insufficiently "open and notorious" to give title owner
notice of a challenge to its title); ef Flowers v. Roberts. 979 S.W.2d 465. 470 71 (Mo. Ct. App.
1998) (holding that evidence of "minimal and sporadic efforts to maintain [a] dirt road, and driving over the road a few times each year" was enough to support finding of actual possession, but
that such possession was not sufficiently open and notorious).
116 See generally Lee Anne Fennell. Efficient Trespass: The Case for "Bad Faith" Adverse
Possession, 100 Nw. U. L. REv. 1037, 1059 65 (2006) (discussing the theory of an efficient trespass).
117
See Klass. supra note , at 293 94 (discussing Sprankling's articles and theory); John G.
Sprankling. The Antiwilderness Bias in American Property Law. 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 519. 593
(1996) (discussing development of adverse possession doctrine related to wild lands): John G.
Sprankling, An Environmental Critique of Adverse Possession, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 816, 840

(1994) (arguing that adverse possession decisions concerning wild lands reflect a "development
model" of adverse possession and that "adverse possession functions to facilitate the economic
exploitation of land").
118 Pierz v. Gorski, 276 N.W.2d 352, 356 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979).
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ly to settle titles and achieve repose when owners aren't responsibly watching
over their land,1 19 courts should consider what a reasonable owner of the type of
land in question would do, both in observing invasions and in responding to
them. 2
E.

Hostile Possession

"Hostile" possession means possession that indicates a claim of ownership inconsistent with the owner's title. 121 Hostile possession is often contrasted
with possession by permission of the owner, which will not support an adverse
possession claim.
Courts have reasoned that some acts of possession that
would be hostile in urban settings are not hostile in rural settings because in
certain rural settings owners presumably consent to some kinds of uses by others while urban owners presumably do not.
One example of such a distinction is to presume that owners of wild and
uncultivated land implicitly give permission to others to use the land in its wild
state, even though the same acts of possession would be presumed to be hostile
if the land were improved. 123 This presumption is more prominent in prescriptive easement cases, which I discuss below. But some adverse possession cases
1 24
have also reversed the usual presumption of hostility in such circumstances.
These cases reason that owners of such land implicitly give permission to such
use because it does not impair the owner's interest in the property in any way
and sometimes also because the land isn't worth much. 125 The presumption is
based on a factual generalization about wild lands and their owners and so raises
the risk of legal decisions based on stereotypes and assumptions rather than
facts. The presumption certainly makes it harder for one to prove adverse possession of wild land, but that may be a good thing because of the difficulties the
119

See, e.g., WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.7, at

860 (3d ed. 2000) ("Adverse possession is best explained as a doctrine of repose.").
120 Cf Klass, supra note (arguing that the owner of wild lands may reasonably intend simply to
conserve the land, and therefore may monitor and respond in light of that intention).
121
See, e.g., 3 AM. JuR. 2D Adverse Possession § 43 (2010) ("The requirement for adverse
possession that the possession be hostile does not require ill will or malice, but an assertion of
ownership adverse to that of the true owner and all others .... Hostile possession must be such as
to import a denial of the owner's title or oust the owner from the land.").
122
See, e.g., Hovendick v. Ruby, 10 P.3d 1119, 1122 (Wyo. 2000) ("[I]f a claimant's use of the
property is shown to be permissive, then he cannot acquire title by adverse possession.").
123
See, e.g., Spaulding v. Pouliot, 181 P.3d 243, 250 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008).

124

See id.; D'Angelo v. McNutt, 868 A.2d 239. 243 (Me. 2005) (citing presumption in adverse

possession discussion).
125
See, e.g., Town of Manchester v. Augusta Country Club, 477 A.2d 1124, 1130 (Me. 1984)
("This rule is predicated on the notion that such use by the general public is consistent with, and in
no way diminishes, the rights of the owner in his land."); Littlefield v. Hubbard, 128 A. 285, 288
(Me. 1925) (reasoning that "open. uninclosed character of the land" and its "trifling value" suggest that owner permitted use by public).
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title owner faces in monitoring such land. If properly applied, the presumption
lightens the burden on owners while still allowing possessors to rebut the presumption by proving the land was not so wild, that the owner reasonably would
not have implicitly
permitted the possessor's particular actions on the property,
26
and so on.
Animal grazing cases may be another example of an urban-rural distinction. Surely if someone consistently turned out his animals to feed on developed, urban or suburban land, without asking permission, that would indicate
hostile possession. But many cases have held that doing so on unenclosed rural
land is insufficient to obtain title by adverse possession. 12 Although their explanations vary, the best explanation seems to be that such possession is not
inconsistent with the title owner's rights because, given the nature of the land,
the title owner implicitly consents to such possession.
IV. PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENTS

Like adverse possession, obtaining a prescriptive easement requires
open and hostile or adverse use of another's land. Most courts ordinarily presume that open use of another's land is hostile, under a claim of right, and therefore the servient owner must prove otherwise, that it was permissive, in order to
defeat the prescriptive easement claim. 128 But many cases have reversed this
presumption when the claimed easement is a right-of-way over unfenced rural
property, reasoning that the owner has implicitly given permission to others to
pass over the property.
As one court explained, "the owner of such land in
126

See D'Angelo, 868 A.2d at 243 (finding sufficient evidence that land was not wild and un-

cultivated, and therefore presumption of permission did not apply).
127
See Harris v. Lynch, 940 S.W.2d 42, 45 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that allowing animals
to access defendant's wooded land did not constitute adverse possession).
128
See, e.g.. Gusheroski v. Lewis, 167 P.2d 390. 393 (Ariz. 1946) ("Where the claimant has
shown an open, visible, continuous, and unmolested use of the land of another for the period of
time sufficient to acquire title by adverse possession, the use will be presumed to be under a claim
of right, and not by license of the owner. In order to overcome this presumption. thereby saving
his title from the encumbrance of an easement, the burden is upon the owner to show that the use
was permissive."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 2.16 cmt. g (2000) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY] ("The majority of American states apply a presumption that an
unexplained, open or notorious use of land, continued for the prescriptive period, is adverse .... ).
129
See England v. Ally Ong Hing, 459 P.2d 498, 505 (Ariz. 1969) (presuming permission for
cattle to graze on large, unenclosed tract of land, stating that "it is a matter of common knowledge
that the owners do not object to persons passing over them for their accommodation and convenience"); Du Mez v. Dykstra, 241 N.W. 182 (Mich. 1932) ("[W]hile use alone may give notice of
adverse claim of inclosed premises. the weight of authority is that it raises no presumption of
hostility in the use of wild lands. This distinction is in recognition of the general custom of owners of wild lands to permit the public to pass over them without hindrance .... The tacit permission to use wild lands is a kindly act which the law does not penalize by permitting a beneficiary

of the act to acquire a right in the other's land by way of legal presumption, but it requires that he
bring home to the owner, by word or act, notice of a claim of right before he may obtain title by
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many instances will not be in position to readily detect or prevent others from
crossing over his land, and, even if he did, he might not enter any objection because of a desire to accommodate others and because such usage resulted in no
immediate damage to him."' 130 One court also suggested that this reversed presumption furthers a public policy apparently unique to rural areas, "to advance
friendly relations, good neighborliness and sociability between people living in
sparsely settled or rural areas."' 13 1 Therefore, because the use is not hostile, even
a long period of use will not result
in a prescriptive easement enforceable
132
against the owner of the property.
Although such use alone may not indicate hostility, as long as the servient owner knows of the hostile claim, the owner should object within the permitted time period. 133 Even so, the presumption of permission means that those
who pass over unfenced rural land must do more to obtain a prescriptive easement. It isn't enough to pass over the property openly without interruption for a
long time, as an easement owner would do. The user would have to otherwise
communicate hostility to the servient owner, such as by substantially altering
the land in using the easement or directly expressing hostile intent to the servient owner.
The result of this reasoning seems to disadvantage the most deserving
claimants. A user who doubts the status of her claim might consider the need to
communicate it clearly to the servient owner in some way other than simply
using the easement. But if the servient owner never disputes the user's right to
pass over the land, the user who does not doubt her claim of right may never
have reason to demonstrate her belief to the servient owner. The result is that
those acting entirely in good faith, with no reason to think they need to express
prescription."); Hester v. Sawyers, 71 P.2d 646, 651 (N.M. 1937); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY,
supra note , § 2.16 cmt. g ("Evidence that the claimed servient estate was wild, unenclosed, va-

cant land overcomes the presumption of prescriptive use ... creating a presumption that the use
was permissive.").
130 Fullenwider v. Kitchens, 266 S.W.2d 281, 283 (Ark. 1954).
131 Castillo v. Tabet Lumber Co., 406 P.2d 361, 363 (N.M. 1965); accord Jicarilla Apache

Tribe v. Bd.

of County Comm'rs, 862 P.2d 428, 440 (N.M. 1993).
132 These same reasons may account for some state statutes that require posting signs in rural

areas in order for an entry to be a trespass. See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 11-2111 (McKinney 2005).
133 See Becker v. Thompson, No. 262214, 2006 WL 1408417, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. May 23,
2006) ("Defendants argue that plaintiffs use of the two-track was not hostile because, as its
placement was on undeveloped, wooded land, permissive use is presumed. 'Hostile' merely
means use that is inconsistent with the rights of an owner. Testimony established that defendant's
predecessor in interest was fully aware of plaintiff's use of the property, believing that the property was plaintiff's and that plaintiff held it under a claim of right. This establishes hostility.")
(internal quotation omitted); JicarillaApache Tribe, 862 P.2d at 440 (affirming that use of rural
land was not permissive when title owners "knew or reasonably could have known of the public's
use"); Scholes v. Post Office Canyon Ranch, Inc., 852 P.2d 683, 685-86 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992)
(holding that passage over a large parcel of unenclosed land is still presumed adverse if the use of
the land should be apparent to the title owner).
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hostile intent, will never acquire a durable right over unfenced rural land just by
long use, unlike their urban counterparts. Because the use is presumed permissive rather than hostile, their use will never ripen into a prescriptive easement.
Similarly, some courts have reasoned that rural landowners are more
likely to permit the public generally to cross their property, and therefore acquiescence in 34
such use by the public is less likely to imply an offer of dedication
to the public. 1
Leaving rural property unfenced does not necessarily mean that the
owner invites the world to pass back and forth over her property. There are
many reasons an owner might not fence her property. A court should not rely
on such generalized assumptions about rural landowners, but should consider
the evidence before the court in the specific case. The lack of a fence alone is
ambiguous and should not be sufficient evidence on its own to disprove hostility.
V.

SURFACE WATER

Courts have applied versions of three different rules for resolving disputes between owners who alter the natural drainage of diffuse surface water
and owners whose property is injured by that alteration. The common enemy
rule allows landowners to alter the drainage of surface water without any liability, although the rule has often been qualified in various ways. 135 The civil law
rule, on the other hand, makes a landowner strictly liable for harm caused by
altering the drainage of surface water. 136 Between these two extremes, the reasonable use rule allows a landowner to alter37 the drainage of surface water unless
it causes unreasonable harm to other land. 1
The civil law rule seems to discourage development of land because almost any land improvement will alter surface drainage and possibly result in
liability. 38 Of course, as the California Supreme Court observed, California's
growth does not seem to have been impeded by its application of the civil law

134 See JicarillaApache Tribe, 862 P.2d at 439-40 (indicating that presumption of permission
applies to claims of public easements as well); Bradford v. Nature Conservancy, 294 S.E.2d 866,

875 (Va. 1982) ("[W]hat may amount to a dedication in an urban area will not serve the same
purpose in a rural one."). The government also may be less likely to want to assume responsibility for maintaining a rural road, so the government cannot implicitly accept the offer of dedication
by use, but must expressly accept the dedication. See E.S. Chappell & Son. Inc. v. Brooks. 450
S.E.2d 156, 158 (Va. 1994); Bradford, 294 S.E.2d at 875.
135 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Mackin, 376 So. 2d 684. 685 (Ala. 1979).
136
See, e.g., id. at 686.
137

See, e.g., Enderson v. Kelehan, 32 N.W.2d 286, 289 (Minn. 1948).

138

See Keys v. Romley, 412 P.2d 529, 533 (Cal. 1966) (en banc) ("The civil law rule, if strictly

applied, admittedly has some tendency to inhibit improvement of land, since almost any use of the
property is likely to cause a change in the natural drainage which may justify complaint by an
adjoining landowner.").

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2010

29

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 112, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 5
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 112

rule. 139 But because of the perception that the civil law rule inhibits development, the civil law rule has been more common in rural places, as the Supreme
Court of Alabama observed:
The adoption of the Civil Law Rule by Alabama is no doubt a
result of the fact that at that time the state was predominantly
agrarian and that rule is best fitted to an agrarian society which
assumes land as remaining in a natural or near natural state. On
the other hand, the Common Enemy Rule is better fitted for the
development of cities and towns and was thus adopted by those
jurisdictions more urban in nature. 140
Some courts, including Alabama courts, have therefore reasoned that,
while the civil law rule should apply in rural places, a version of the reasonable
use rule or the common enemy rule should apply in urban places. 14 1 The civil
law rule is commonly defended as preserving the natural rights of landowners,
because some land naturally is subject to drainage from other land.1 42 But in
urban areas, these courts have suggested, the land is only suitable for develop139

See id. at 535.

140

Mitchell, 376 So. 2d at 688.
See Kay-Noojin Dev. Co. v. Hackett, 45 So. 2d 792, 794 (Ala. 1950) (noting general rule in

141

Alabama that, while civil law rule applies outside of incorporated towns, within incorporated
towns an owner may build structures to deflect surface water that would naturally drain onto his
land); Woods v. Inc. Town of State Centre, 85 N.W.2d 519, 525 (Iowa 1957) ("It must be recognized that there is a different rule applicable to urban and rural lands pertaining to the disposal of
surface water. Clearly. in rural territory one may acquire a prescriptive right across another's land
by discharging surface water artificially-collected or directed upon the other's property. In such
cases the original act is not excusable but is wrongful from the start."); Vill. of Trenton v. Rucker,
127 N.W. 39 (Mich. 1910) ("Treating this case as falling within the rural rather than the urban,
class, there is no difficulty in holding that the defendant is bound ... to receive the flow of surface
water from the adjacent higher land, coming in substantially its natural amount and condition.");
Stone v. Weese, No. 8989, 1979 WL 207551, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 14, 1979); Lunsford v.
Stewart, 120 N.E.2d 136, 136 37 (Ohio Ct. App. 1953); First Lady. LLC v. JMF Props., LLC,
681 N.W.2d 94. 97 98 (S.D. 2004) (reaffirming application of civil law rule to rural property and
reasonable use rule to urban property); Mulder v. Tague, 186 N.W.2d 884. 889 (S.D. 1971) (acknowledging application of civil law rule to rural areas, but adopting reasonable use rule for urban
areas); cf Sumitomo Corp. v. Deal, 569 S.E.2d 608, 611-12 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (applying civil
law rule despite developer's argument that it "stifles . . . converting raw, rural land to modern
urbanized development"); Westbury Realty Corp. v. Lancaster Shopping Ctr., Inc., 152 A.2d 669,
672 (Pa. 1959) (noting that the usual state rule would allow higher owner to reasonably alter drainage without liability, but holding that a shopping center in a rural area is not a reasonable or
natural use, and therefore developer was liable for damage from alteration).
142
See, e.g., Mitchell, 376 So. 2d at 686; Dekle v. Vann, 182 So. 2d 885, 887 (Ala. 1966) ("As
to lands outside a municipality, our decisions have adopted the civil law rule, that is the inferior
heritage or lower surface is doomed by nature to bear a servitude to the superior in that it must
receive the water that falls on and flows from the higher land."): Keys, 412 P.2d at 532 ("The rule
finds its justification in the concept that those purchasing or otherwise acquiring land should expect and be required to accept it subject to the burdens of natural drainage.").
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ment, which inevitably alters surface drainage. 143 Therefore, these courts have
applied a rule that allows some or all development without liability for the inevitable alteration of drainage.
But land development in rural areas alters drainage just as much as land
development in urban areas. Maybe these courts have treated urban and rural
areas differently because they believe that development in urban areas is more
valuable or important. If so, that seems clearly indefensible. A rural landowner
44
has the same interest as an urban landowner in productively using property.
One court noted that when land in an area has been developed, the civil law rule
may create an "onerous burden of proof as to what the natural conditions were
or would be if not altered.', 145 And in some cases, rural development may more
easily avoid harm to neighboring land because there may be more space and
alternatives. But this is certainly not true for all rural development; rural development may be on smaller parcels of land just as in urban places. Rather than
applying different rules to urban and rural places because of such concerns,
courts can just consider the actual circumstances of the parties and the properties involved. Alabama decisions, for example, eventually arrived at this conclusion. The Supreme Court of Alabama, noting the state's traditional distinction between rural and urban areas, reasoned that "the interest of progress and
development, under some circumstances," would permit a higher landowner to
alter surface drainage in a rural area without liability, as long as the owner acts
prudently and does not increase the amount of water flowing onto lower neighboring property. 146
Similarly, California has continued to apply the civil law rule to all
property, rejecting a rural-urban distinction, but it has recognized that the civil
law rule may be "unnecessarily rigid and occasionally unjust, particularly in
143 See Keys, 412 P.2d at 533 ("[S]ome courts normally applying the civil law rule have sug-

gested that it is not adaptable to the needs of urban communities, where the primary use of land is
the erection of structures which are likely to interfere with natural drainage, and accordingly those
courts have adopted common enemy or modified common enemy rules in cases involving such
land.").- Mulder, 186 N.W.2d at 888 ("As any change in grade, level, or topography might affect
natural drainage, the civil law rule cannot reasonably be strictly applied in urban areas. To do so
would prevent the proper use, development, improvement, and enjoyment of considerable urban
property. Also the reason for the rule disappears in areas where adequate artificial drains and
storm sewers are provided.").
144
Cf Carland v. Aurin, 53 S.W. 940, 941 (Tenn. 1899) ("We are unable to see any difference
in principle between the reciprocal rights and duties of adjacent urban proprietors and those of
adjacent rural proprietors, and hence we do not think it wise to apply one rule to city lots and a
different rule to agricultural lands.").
145
Keys, 412 P.2d at 535: see also City of Englewood v. Miller, 392 P.2d 591. 592 93 (Colo.
1964) (holding that city had not proved that surface water would have naturally drained across
defendant's property in the absence of previous alterations of the land by the city itself).
146

Mitchell, 376 So. 2d at 687 (quoting Vinson v. Turner, 40 So. 2d 863, 864-65 (Ala. 1949)).

The court had previously refused to consider applying the common enemy rule to rural subdivisions, stressing the importance of definite and predictable property rules. See Dekle. 182 So. 2d at
887 88.
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heavily developed areas."' 147 Therefore, California cases hold that, while the
party altering the natural drainage will ordinarily be liable when both parties
have acted reasonably, in some cases an owner may reasonably alter drainage
without liability when "the utility of the possessor's use of his land outweighs
the gravity
of the harm which results from his alteration of the flow of surface
148

waters."

The reasonable use rule, or modified versions of the civil law and common enemy rules, can and should include consideration of such circumstances,
149
including the necessity for the alteration, reasonable alternatives, and so on.
The relevant circumstances may include the rural or urban character of the land
and whether the development is typical in such an area. 50 However, reasonable
use decisions have also said the court should weigh the value of the use of the
drained land against the harm to the other land.' 5 ' Such a balancing test, like in
nuisance cases generally, may result in inadequate protection for less intensive
uses in rural settings. 52 Courts applying the reasonable use rule, or modified
versions of the civil law and common enemy rules, should not simply favor the
more intensive, more valuable use at the expense of the less intensive use. As
the New Jersey Supreme Court observed:
147

Keys, 412 P.2d at 535.

148

Id. at 537.

149 See, e.g.. Mitchell, 376 So. 2d at 689: Enderson v. Kelehan, 32 N.W.2d 286. 289 (Minn.
1948) ("[A] landowner, acting in good faith. may drain his land of surface waters and cast them as
a burden upon the land of another, although such drainage carries with it some waters which
would otherwise have never gone that way but would have remained on the land until they were
absorbed by the soil or evaporated in the air, if (a) There is a reasonable necessity for such drainage; (b) If reasonable care be taken to avoid unnecessary injury to the land receiving the burden;
(c) If the utility or benefit accruing to the land drained reasonably outweighs the gravity of the
harm resulting to the land receiving the burden; and (d) If, where practicable, it is accomplished
by reasonably improving and aiding the normal and natural system of drainage according to its
reasonable carrying capacity. or if, in the absence of a practicable natural drain, a reasonable and
feasible artificial drainage system is adopted."): Bohemian Brethren Presbyterian Church v. Greek
Archdiocesan Cathedral of Holy Trinity, 405 N.Y.S.2d 926, 928 (Sup. Ct. 1978) ("As the demands of the community grow more complex, principles which have the attractiveness of simplicity no longer satisfy the competing and varying social needs ....
The growth of urban areas, as
well as other ecological and socio-economic factors affecting waters rights, have riddled the
common enemy and the civil law approaches with numerous exceptions."); First Lady, LLC v.
JMF Props., LLC, 681 N.W.2d 94, 99 (S.D. 2004).
150
See Westbury Realty Corp. v. Lancaster Shopping Ctr., Inc., 152 A.2d 669, 672 (Pa. 1959)
("Even though the shopping center is developed in a rural section, the center has all of the characteristics of an urban development. This requires new attitudes, both on behalf of the developers as
well as the court. While the owners of higher lands have the right to have the water flowing from
their lands discharged in a natural watercourse upon the lower lands, and while the upper lands
may increase the flow through the natural and reasonable use of the lands, a large shopping center
development in a rural area ...

cannot be considered a natural use of the land ....

Rather, it is an

artificial use of the land for which the developers must make the proper accommodation so as not
to place the burden of the increased flow upon the servient tenement.").
151 See, e.g., Armstrong v. Francis Corp.. 120 A.2d 4, 10 (N.J. 1956).
152 See supraPart I.C.
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It is, of course, true that society has a great interest that land
shall be developed for the greater good. It is therefore properly
a consideration in these cases whether the utility of the possessor's use of his land outweighs the gravity of the harm which
results from his alteration of the flow of surface waters. But
while today's mass home building projects ... are assuredly in

the social good, no reason suggests itself why, in justice, the
economic costs incident to the expulsion of surface waters in
the transformation of the rural or semi-rural areas of our State
into urban or suburban communities should be borne in every
case by adjoining landowners rather than by those who engage
in such projects for profit. Social progress and the common
wellbeing are in actuality better served by a just and right balancing of the competing interests according to the general principles of fairness and common
sense which attend the applica153
tion of the rule of reason.
VI. CONCLUSION

These examples of rural-urban differences in the substance and application of property law illustrate several themes and issues. First and most obvious, rural places have distinctive characteristics that courts should consider in
applying certain general rules. Nuisance cases consider whether an activity is
appropriate in its surroundings. Adverse possession cases recognize that owners
of some rural lands may use land less extensively, exclusively, and continuously. But sometimes courts do not appropriately recognize or consider those distinctive characteristics. Most courts, for example, seem to under-appreciate the
significance of aesthetic injuries in some rural settings. Many courts also fail to
consider differences in how title owners would reasonably act in some rural
settings, allowing adverse possessors to satisfy elements of the claim with lesser
acts, but not recognizing that title owners would likewise reasonably be less
aware of trespasses on some rural lands.
In some cases, insensitivity to rural realities seems to result from assumptions and stereotypes about rural places. Nuisance cases may assume rural
places are quiet and beautiful. Some judges may continue to believe that rural
tenants need less assurance of habitability or less protection from landlords.
Some surface water cases seem to indicate a belief that rural development isn't
as important as urban development and that rural land is undeveloped land.
Some courts apply different surface water rules to urban and rural places, based
on over-generalized assumptions about their characteristics, rather than considering the actual circumstances of the property at issue. Adverse possession and
prescriptive easements uncritically presume that owners of undeveloped or un153

Armstrong, 120 A.2d at 10.
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enclosed rural land intend to permit others to possess and use their land. Better
attention to the realities of the land would help address both the mistakes of
insensitivity and stereotyping.
Even when courts are aware of rural realities, they may undervalue rural
uses. Nuisance cases, for example, may balance competing uses without even
considering environmental, open space, land use diversity, and social values that
less intensive rural uses may serve. Courts generally refuse to consider the value of the surrounding landscape even though that may be an important part of
the value and use of rural land. And any time a rule calls for balancing use values, such as nuisance and surface water rules, there is the risk that rural uses,
being less intensive, will lose in the balance to more intensive, urbanizing uses.
When courts and traditional property rules do not sufficiently recognize
rural values, legislative action may more directly decide the extent to which
such values should be protected in relation to other values. Right-to-farm laws,
for example, have surely provided greater protection to agricultural uses than
would a simple change in nuisance doctrine to weigh agricultural uses more
heavily in the balance against encroaching uses. Aesthetic regulations may specifically protect certain types of aesthetic values. Legislation might likewise be
appropriate to authorize and adopt building and housing codes in rural places
and to adopt surface water rules. But legislation obviously will not and cannot
address all of the ways that courts must consider rural circumstances. Courts
must evaluate the realities of the land in individual cases and consider the value
of rural uses.
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